

## Section 7 - Rise of China and Anti-Americanism - Discussion Questions

### **Friedberg (2005)/Khong (2014)**

Why might a power transition lead to conflict? What factors make the declining state less willing to compromise? Do all power transitions inevitably lead to war?

Which issue areas lend themselves more to comprise in the U.S.-China strategic relationship? Which issue areas are more "indivisible?" What might this tell us about the propensity of conflict between the two states?

White (2012) points to one reason why states may fail to de-escalate a conflict - reputation. For example he argues that "China's reputation as a great power and its aspirations as Asia's hegemon would be severely dented if Beijing backed down in the wake of U.S. military intervention." How valid are concerns about reputation-building in international relations? Do leaders draw inferences from past behavior - does it even make sense to do so?

How much do the strategic cultures of the United States and China matter for predicting the future of the U.S.-Sino relationship?

Discuss the relationship between regime type and nationalism. Would a democratic China be more or less affected by nationalist pressures for expansion?

Liberal pessimists and optimists both point to domestic political factors as forces encouraging or constraining the possibility of a conflict-prone China. What domestic constituencies does each group emphasize? Under what conditions are each of these constituencies influential?

Likewise, on what questions do realist pessimists and optimists differ regarding China's rise? Are these propositions empirically testable?

### **Katzenstein and Keohane (2007)/ Herrmann and Kertzer (2015)**

What is the distinction between opinion and bias? Why do Katzenstein and Keohane argue that bias has a social component?

Drawing on our previous discussion of cognition and bounded rationality, why are biases so durable? How can they be changed?

What is the role of elites in affecting anti-American views within a public? Why do elites play such an important role and what are their incentives to promote a pro- or anti- American bias? What role do they play in affecting "fear" and how does fear affect anti-Americanism?

Why might negative "opinion" become, in the long-run, negative "bias"?

Why is it difficult to distinguish between bias and opinion just by observing poll numbers? What are some possible empirical strategies for disentangling the two?

What distinguishes "social" from "radical" anti-Americanism? How might one bleed into the other?

What do Herrmann and Kertzer's findings tell us about public opinion in France? Is disapproval of the United States due to "opinion" on issues or due to "bias" against the U.S. itself?

Comment on the experimental design used in Herrmann and Kertzer. Are the proposed counterfactuals sufficiently reasonable? What would be the "ideal" experimental counterfactual?