[gov3009-l] Kellerman on "Electoral Punishment as Signaling in Subnational Elections"

Justin Grimmer jgrimmer at fas.harvard.edu
Sun Oct 26 22:02:21 EDT 2008


Dear Applied Statistics Community,

Please join us this Wednesday, October 29th, when Michael Kellerman, PhD
Candidate in the Department of Government, will present his work on  "Electoral
Punishment as Signaling in Subnational Elections".  Mike provided the
following abstract,

 It is a well-established empirical regularity that parties in federal
office suffer setbacks in state-level elections. Many authors attribute this
to a desire on the part of voters to balance the policy preferences of the
federal incumbent. In this paper, I consider an alternative explanation with
a long tradition in the literature: voters punish the party of the federal
incumbent in state elections in order to send a signal to the federal
government. I construct a simple signaling model to formalize this
intuition, which predicts that under most circumstances signaling can occur
at only one level of government. I estimate a statistical model allowing for
electoral punishment using data from German elections and find support for
punishment at the state level, rather than the punishment at both levels
implied by balancing theories.



Mike also provided a copy of his paper, available here:
http://people.fas.harvard.edu/~kellerm/balsig.pdf

 The applied statistics workshop meets each Wednesday in room K-354
CGIS-Knafel, 1737 Cambridge St, Cambridge MA.  The workshop convenes at 12
noon with a light-lunch, presentations usually begin around 1215 and
conclude by 130 pm.  As always, everyone is welcome!

Cheers

Justin Grimmer
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